Equity in financing and use of health care in Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania: implications for paths to universal coverage. by Mills, Anne et al.
Equity in financing and use of health care in Ghana, South Africa 
and Tanzania: implications for paths to universal coverage 
 
Anne Mills, James Akazili, John E. Ataguba, Jo Borghi, Bertha Garshong, Suzan 
Makawia, Gemini Mtei, Bronwyn Harris, Jane Macha, Filip Meheus, Di McIntyre 
 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Keppel Street, WC1E 7HT, 
London (Prof A. Mills PhD, J. Borghi PhD) 
Navrongo Health Research Centre, Ghana Health Service, Navrongo, Ghana (J. Akazili 
PhD) 
Health Economics Unit, School of Public Health and Family Medicine, University of 
Cape Town, Health Sciences Faculty, Anzio Road, Observatory, 7925, South Africa 
(Prof D. McIntyre PhD, J.E. Ataguba MPH)  
Ghana Health Service, PO Box GP184, Accra, Ghana (B. Garshong MA) 
Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box 78373, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (G. Mtei MA, S. 
Makawia BSc, J. Macha MA) 
Centre for Health Policy, School of Public Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, 
University of the Witwatersrand, PO Box 1038, Johannesburg, 2000, South Africa(B. 
Harris MA) 
Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium and Royal Tropical Institute, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands (F. Meheus MSc) 
 
Corresponding author: Di McIntyre, Health Economics Unit, School of Public Health 
and Family Medicine, University of Cape Town, Health Sciences Faculty, Anzio Road, 
Observatory, 7925, South Africa 
E-mail: Diane.McIntyre@uct.ac.za 




Universal coverage of health care is now receiving considerable global and national 
attention, but debate persists on the best mix of financing mechanisms, especially to 
protect those outside the formal employment sector. Critical questions are the 
equity implications of different financing mechanisms, and patterns of service use. 
We report the first whole system analysis - integrating both public and private 
sectors - of the equity of health system financing and service use in Ghana, South 
Africa, and Tanzania. 
 
Methods 
Primary and secondary data were used to calculate the progressivity of each health 
care financing mechanism, catastrophic spending on health care, and the 




Overall health care financing was progressive in all three countries, as were direct 
taxes. Indirect taxes were regressive in South Africa but progressive in Ghana and 
Tanzania.  Out-of-pocket payments were regressive in all three countries. Health 
insurance contributions by those outside the formal sector were regressive in both 
Ghana and Tanzania. The overall distribution of service benefits in all three countries 
was pro-rich, though the burden of illness was relatively greater for lower income 
groups. Access to needed, appropriate services was the biggest challenge to 
universal coverage in all three countries.   
 
Interpretation 
Analyses of the equity of financing and service use provide guidance on which 
financing mechanisms to expand, and especially raise questions over the appropriate 
financing mechanism for the health care of those outside the formal sector. 
Addressing physical and financial barriers to service access is critical if universal 
coverage is to become a reality. 
 Funding 
EU and IDRC. 
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Introduction 
There is a growing focus on the goal of universal coverage in health systems.  For 
example, the World Health Report 2010 on universal coverage of health care1, and 
the associated declaration of the World Health Assembly urged member states to 
‘aim for affordable universal coverage and access for all citizens on the basis of 
equity and solidarity’2.  A number of countries have developed recent policy 
proposals to pursue this goal, such as India3 and South Africa4.  The generally 
accepted core of universal coverage is that the health system should be financed 
according to ability to pay, and benefits received according to health care need (see 
Box 1 for details of universal coverage concept). Analytical tools are available to 
assess health systems relative to these principles, notably in the form of financing 
incidence analysis (assessing whether health care financing methods are progressive, 
regressive, or proportional), and benefit incidence analysis (assessing the monetary 
value of service benefits received by different socio-economic groups). However, 
debate on the relative merits of different approaches to financing health care has 
tended to occur in the absence of good evidence on the equity of current 
arrangements, and even has made generalisations which lack a sufficiently strong 
evidence base – for example that certain forms of tax financing are regressive in low 
income countries, and that public services are exploited more by richer groups.  As 
countries plan their paths to universal coverage, and debate grows on the relative 
merits of financing mechanisms including various types of tax financing, social health 
insurance, community based insurance, and out-of-pocket payments, it is critical 
that better evidence be made available on equity implications. 
 
This paper reports the results of a three-country study on the equity of health 
system financing and service use.  The three countries – Ghana, South Africa, and 
Tanzania – were selected because they are all considering how best to develop their 
health systems towards universal coverage, and they represent systems at different 
stages of development (see Box 2 for a brief overview of each country’s health 
system).  Ghana began implementing a National Health Insurance Scheme in 2004, 
with elements covering both the formal and informal sectors. South Africa has just 
released a Green Paper on introducing a national health insurance4. Tanzania in 
recent decades has introduced various health insurance arrangements, which it 
plans to expand.  All three countries have highly fragmented health systems with 
significant private involvement, so in place of the traditional public sector focus 
alone, this study undertook a whole system analysis, the first such study for African 
countries.  In addition, to make the analyses more useful for policy purposes, we 

















The data for analysing progressivity of health care financing and catastrophic health 
care payments were drawn from the most recent national household survey in each 
country that contained appropriate data (Table 1).  Each dataset contains 
information which can be used to estimate the various forms of tax payments, 
health insurance contributions and out-of-pocket payments.  As household surveys 
are likely to underestimate these payments (e.g. due to under-reporting of income in 
Key messages 
 Decisions on financing mechanisms for universal coverage have important 
implications for equity of financing and health service use 
 Total health care financing was progressive in all three countries 
 Out-of-pocket payments were regressive in all three countries, as was 
voluntary insurance for those outside the formal employment sector in 
Ghana and Tanzania. 
 In contrast to wealthy countries, indirect taxes were progressive in Ghana and 
Tanzania  
 Service benefits were pro-rich in all three countries, including benefits from 
public services except in Tanzania where the distribution of benefits was 
relatively even across income groups 
 Policy makers should note especially that: 
o Indirect (as well as direct) taxes offer a source of financing that is 
both more progressive and easier to collect than voluntary insurance.  
o Good physical and financial access to public and not-for-profit health 
services is critical if benefit incidence is to be made more pro-poor. 
o Segmented financing arrangements, such as private insurance in 
South Africa, make it difficult to introduce cross-subsidies between 
rich and poor. 
 
surveys), the revenues estimated from the surveys were triangulated with actual 
revenue estimates wherever possible.  For example, information on actual revenue 
from personal income tax, corporate income tax, VAT etc. was obtained from tax 
authorities in each country and any difference between actual revenue and that 
estimated from the survey was apportioned to households based on their estimated 
proportional share of contributions to each tax.  A similar approach was used for 
health insurance contributions.  The triangulation process does not affect the 
distribution across socio-economic groups within a particular financing mechanism; 
it simply ensures that when combining distributions across different financing 
mechanisms, the weighting of each financing mechanism reflects the actual share of 
total health care financing of this mechanism. 
 
The only tax for which incidence could not be accurately determined was corporate 
income tax, given the potential for shifting this tax between shareholders and 
households.  For example, if there is relatively little competition for a company’s 
product, the company can set its price and thereby ensure that consumers bear the 
burden of the corporate tax.  In contrast, if there is strong competition, it is difficult 
to influence prices and more likely that shareholders will bear the burden of 
corporate tax.  For illustrative purposes, data reported here assume a 50:50 
distribution; alternative distributions did not change the overall findings. 
 
Household per adult equivalent consumption expenditure was used as the measure 
of socio-economic status. Financing concentration curves were compared with the 
Lorenz curve of household consumption expenditure5.  The Lorenz curve depicts the 
distribution of income or consumption expenditure across households, ordered from 
the poorest household (on the left hand side in Figure 2) to the richest (on the right 
hand side).  If all households had an equal share of income, the Lorenz curve would 
lie on the 45 degree line (i.e. 1% of households would have 1% of income etc.).  The 
financing concentration curve plots the cumulative percentage share of health care 
payments for each household using the same ordering as for the Lorenz curve.  If the 
concentration curve lies between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve (or above 
the 45 degree line), i.e. the percentage share of health care payments for poorer 
households is greater than their percentage share of income or consumption 
expenditure and vice versa for richer households, the financing mechanism is 
regressive (see Box 1). Conversely, if it lies outside the Lorenz curve, it is progressive. 
The relative progressivity of each health care financing mechanism was also assessed 
by calculating the Kakwani Index6, which compares the distribution of health care 
payments (plotted on the concentration curve) with the distribution of income or 
consumption expenditure (plotted on the Lorenz curve).  A negative (positive) 
Kakwani index indicates a regressive (progressive) financing mechanism. 
 
Catastrophic spending on health care was calculated as the percentage of household 
consumption expenditure devoted to out-of-pocket payments on health services.  
Spending is considered catastrophic if it exceeds the commonly used threshold of 
40% or more of non-food household expenditure5.  The rationale behind this 
concept is that having to make this level of out-of-pocket payment for health care is 
likely to translate into households having to sacrifice spending on other basic needs 
and they may need to go into debt or sell productive assets, jeopardising household 
livelihoods.  The number of individuals who were impoverished by out-of-pocket 
health care payments was also calculated (i.e. whose household consumption 
expenditure after making these payments fell below the absolute poverty line of 
$1·25 per capita per day, in 2005 purchasing power parity terms). 
 
Data on the distribution of health service benefits were drawn from household 
surveys that we conducted in 2008 (see Table 1 for details), since available national 
household surveys did not allow for calculation of rates of service utilisation.  
Utilisation rates were calculated for each category of health service, in both the 
public and private health sectors, and multiplied by the unit cost of that service to 
estimate monetary benefits.  Concentration curves of the distribution of service 
benefits were plotted5.  These curves plot the cumulative percentage share of 
benefits from the poorest to the richest household.  If poorer households receive a 
greater share of health care benefits than their population share (e.g. if the poorest 
5% of households receive more than 5% of benefits), the concentration curve lies 
above the 45 degree line and is considered pro-poor (see Box 1).  Conversely, a pro-
rich distribution is indicated by a concentration curve lying below the 45 degree line. 
 
Qualitative data, to inform the interpretation of the quantitative analyses, were 
collected through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews (see Table 1). 
Thematic analysis of qualitative data was undertaken using a framework of core 
access dimensions: availability, affordability and acceptability7. 
 
Limitations 
There are always some limitations associated with the use of household survey data.  
The secondary household surveys used in this study (for the financing incidence 
analysis) are nationally representative surveys with relatively large sample sizes and 
their data collection methods have been improved in recent years (e.g. through the 
use of household income and expenditure diaries).  Triangulation with other data 
sources on total health care financing improves the accuracy of financing incidence 
estimates.  The benefit incidence analysis drew on primary household surveys 
undertaken by the research team.  This was unavoidable as comprehensive service 
utilisation data were not available from secondary surveys.  While it was feasible to 
undertake a national survey in South Africa (due to securing additional funds), the 
surveys in Ghana and Tanzania were undertaken in six and seven districts 
respectively.  Although sampling methods and survey weighting were used to 
support extrapolation to the national level, the data cannot be regarded as fully 
nationally representative. 
 
Role of funding source 
The study funders had no role in design, collection, analysis and interpretation of the 
data, or in writing of the paper. All authors reviewed the final paper and approved 
submission. The corresponding author had full access to all the study data and had 
final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. 
 
Ethical review 
Ethical approval was received from ethics committees in the three study countries 
and from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
 
Results 
Direct taxes were progressive in all three countries. Indirect taxes were regressive in 
South Africa but progressive in Ghana and Tanzania (Figure 1).  Out-of-pocket 
payments were regressive and overall health care financing was progressive in all 
three countries. 
 
Figure 2 shows the differences between the countries in the relative progressivity of 
indirect taxes.  All forms of indirect tax (VAT, fuel levies and excise duties) were 
regressive in South Africa.  In contrast, VAT, excise and import duties were all 
progressive in Tanzania, although VAT was only marginally progressive.  In Ghana, 
while VAT and import duties were progressive, fuel levies were regressive. 
 
The concentration curves for premium contributions by those outside the formal 
sector to the national health insurance scheme in Ghana and to the community 
health fund in Tanzania are shown in Figure 3.  These payments are regressive in 
both countries, more so in Tanzania than in Ghana.  This contrasts with the 
progressivity of mandatory contributions by formal sector workers in these two 
countries (Figure 1) and private voluntary insurance contributions in South Africa 
(Figure 4). 
 
The proportion of the population incurring catastrophic expenditure due to health 
care was 2·43% in Ghana, 1·52% in Tanzania, and 0·09% in South Africa (Figure 5).  
For both Ghana and Tanzania (but not South Africa), the weighted index, which 
accounts for whether a greater number of poorer households than richer 
households make catastrophic payments, exceeded the unweighted index, indicating 
that the burden of catastrophic payments fell more heavily on poorer households. 
The number of people pushed into poverty by these payments was 350,000 (1·59% 
of the population) in Ghana, 215,000 (0·045% of the population) in South Africa, and 
137,000 (0·37% of the population) in Tanzania.  Figure 5 visibly demonstrates that 
the magnitude of the problem of out-of-pocket payments was greatest in Ghana, 
then Tanzania, with South Africa having the greatest degree of financial protection.   
 
Figure 6 shows that overall health service benefits were pro-rich in all three 
countries, with services being most pro-rich in South Africa and only marginally so in 
Tanzania.  While public sector and faith-based organisations’ health service benefits 
in Tanzania were relatively evenly distributed across the population, those from 
private for-profit services were strongly pro-rich.  In Ghana and South Africa, 
benefits from public sector services were pro-rich and from the private sector even 
more so. 
 
Box 3 provides an overview of the key access issues that constrained the use of 
health services, and hence influenced the extent to which different groups were able 
to benefit from health services.  It highlights problems in relation to the availability, 
affordability and acceptability of services. 
 
Discussion 
Equity of financing 
Despite very different health care financing arrangements in the three countries (see 
Box 2), financing was consistently found to be progressive in all three, though there 
were wide variations in the relative progressivity of different funding sources across 
countries. While it is perhaps not unexpected that total health care financing was 
progressive, given that richer groups may be more able to contribute to the cost of 
their health care, it is notable that all public sources of finance were progressive in 
all three countries (with the sole exception of indirect taxes in South Africa), in 
contrast to a common perception that public financing sources can be regressive 
because richer groups are better able to avoid paying tax.  
 
There are no similar data for other African countries, but data for OECD and for a set 
of Asian countries are available from two studies8,9and are summarized in Table 3 so 
they can be compared with our findings. The South African picture of regressive 
indirect taxes was more in line with that of OECD countries and some middle- and 
high-income countries in Asia; the Ghanaian and Tanzanian pattern of progressive 
indirect taxes was more similar to that of low- and middle-income countries in Asia.  
As economies grow, lower socio-economic groups become able to purchase a wider 
range of goods and services on which indirect taxes are levied, leading to these taxes 
becoming regressive.  However, it is important to note that for low-income countries 
that have not yet reached this point, indirect taxes can be a source of non-regressive 
financing for health care (as is the case in Ghana with the NHI levy which is part of 
VAT), as well as contributing significantly to the total tax base.  
 
Out-of-pocket payments have been found to be consistently regressive in OECD 
countries, but ‘progressive’ in a number of Asian countries since poorer groups are 
unable to afford to use services. They were regressive in all three African countries 
included here, most notably in Tanzania and Ghana where out-of-pocket payments 
are still a large share of total health care expenditure. Levels of catastrophic 
spending are so much greater in Ghana than the other two countries due to the long 
history of relatively high user fees at public sector facilities.  Ghana has the 
distinction of being the African country that generated the highest levels of user fee 
revenue, equivalent to 15% of total government recurrent expenditure in the 
1980s10.  Those who are not yet covered by the NHI continue to bear the 
consequences of these high user fees. In South Africa, most of these out-of-pocket 
payments are made as co-payments by those covered by private insurance.  While 
these are richer groups, the payments can none-the-less be catastrophic and should 
not be ignored.  Although all countries have mechanisms for exempting vulnerable 
groups from user fees at public facilities, our primary household survey data (see 
Table 1) indicate that some of those eligible for exemptions did not receive them 
(11% in Tanzania and about a quarter in Ghana and South Africa).  A key contributory 
factor was lack of awareness by patients of their entitlements (see Box 3). 
 
The burden of out-of-pocket payments has encouraged African countries to 
introduce and expand health insurance coverage through various types of schemes. 
Mandatory insurance contributions by the formal sector in Ghana and Tanzania, and 
private insurance in South Africa, were progressive because the schemes are 
targeted at workers in the formal sector, the less poor.  However, in South Africa, 
only some formal sector workers belong to private insurance, and more importantly, 
flat contributions are charged – so while private insurance contributions are 
progressive if viewed over the entire population, they are regressive when evaluated 
across only private insurance members. 
 
Voluntary, community-based health insurance is being widely promoted as an 
important means to financial protection (see for example11). However, contributions 
to community health insurance by those outside the formal sector are regressive in 
both countries.  This is not unexpected since contributions are generally made as flat 
amounts and members of such schemes are often from poorer groups.  In Ghana, 
contributions are supposed to be related to income, but in reality variations in 
household income cannot be distinguished. Both countries have policies to exempt 
the poor from paying a premium, but face difficulties in identifying them.  
 
Equity of use of services 
The overall distribution of benefits in all three countries was pro-rich, though the 
burden of illness was relatively greater for lower income groups121314. It was clear 
that access to needed, appropriate services was the biggest problem in terms of 
universal coverage in the three African countries.  The relatively even distribution of 
benefits in Tanzania was due to the even distribution of both public sector service 
and faith-based organizations’ benefits and limited service provision by the private 
for-profit sector.  In the two other countries, public services were pro-rich and hence 
accentuated the expected pro-rich orientation of private for-profit services. 
 
Key factors influencing this picture of benefit incidence, all of which affected poorer 
groups more severely, were: affordability constraints to accessing public services, 
particularly the costs of health care and transport to facilities; service availability 
problems such as frequent drug stock-outs, limited or no diagnostic equipment and 
insufficient skilled staff; and service acceptability challenges such as poor staff 
attitudes and lack of confidence in the skills of health workers (see Box 3). 
 
Overall health system equity 
A unique feature of this study is that it undertook a system-wide evaluation of 
financing and benefit incidence in both the public and private sectors.  While 
financing incidence studies usually cover all funding sources, whether public or 
private, benefit incidence studies have traditionally focussed only on the benefits 
from using public sector services.  If the public sector alone had been considered, 
inequities in the distribution of benefits from service use would have appeared to be 
relatively small.  The inclusion of use of private sector services, particularly those 
provided by the for-profit sector, reveals much wider disparities in the distribution of 
health service benefits. 
 
In the context of limited human resources in low- and middle-income countries and 
the drive towards universal coverage, services provided by both the public and 
private health sectors are of relevance.  In order to inform changes relating to how 
health care funds are generated and pooled as well as how services are purchased, it 
is important to consider all elements of the current health system through the lens 
of the principles underpinning universal coverage (i.e. payment according to ability-
to-pay and service benefit according to need). 
 
The system-wide analysis presented in this paper highlights that, while there 
certainly could be changes in financing mechanisms to reduce catastrophic spending 
and promote more progressive financing, one of the greatest challenges in all three 
countries is to change the distribution of health service benefits through addressing 
pervasive access constraints. 
 
Conclusion 
As countries plan their paths to universal coverage, it is critical that they understand 
the equity of current arrangements.  While there has been some attention paid to 
the equity of public service use, there has been much less attention given to the 
equity of different ways of financing services.   We add critical information to the 
universal coverage debate, in four main ways. 
 
Firstly, this is the first time that such data have been presented for African countries.  
 
Secondly, this paper has provided the first analysis of the financing incidence of 
voluntary schemes covering those outside the formal employment sector.  The 
finding that this type of insurance is regressive raises considerable concerns over 
recommending it as the first step on a path to universal coverage.  In contrast there 
are other financing mechanisms for covering the informal sector which are not 
regressive, notably VAT payments in Tanzania and Ghana, and direct taxes.  The 
question of the most equitable and efficient way of providing financial protection for 
those outside the formal sector is one of the most critical issues facing low-income 
countries15. 
 
Thirdly, we show the importance of ensuring physical and financial access to services 
if universal coverage is to be a reality.   
 
Finally, the South African analysis shows the critical importance of encouraging 
income and risk cross-subsidies between different population groups.  Those with 
private insurance form a separate pool, which is then not available to cross-subsidize 
poorer population groups.  Countries need to beware of segmenting their population 
by health financing arrangement.  Once embedded in a health system, such 
segmentation can be very difficult to remove, as indeed South Africa has found. 
Future research in these three countries should test evolving policies against 
whether they will improve the equity of financing arrangements and service use.  
Beyond these countries, similar analyses should be done in other countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, both to inform policies in those countries and to build up a better 
picture of the equity of health systems arrangements across the continent, and to be 
able to begin to explore relationships between particular health system 
arrangements and their equity implications.   
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Box 1: Glossary of key terms 
Universal coverage has two key components: 
 “provide all people with access to needed health services (including prevention, 
promotion, treatment and rehabilitation) of sufficient quality to be effective; 
 ensure that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship.” 1 
 
Progressive financing: a financing mechanism whereby higher-income groups contribute a 
higher percentage of their income than do lower-income groups (represented by a positive 
Kakwani Index) 
 
Proportional financing: a financing mechanism, whereby everyone contributes the same 
percentage of income to funding health care, irrespective of income level (represented by a 
Kakwani Index of zero) 
 
Regressive financing: a financing mechanism whereby lower-income groups contribute a 
higher percentage of their income than higher-income groups (represented by a negative 
Kakwani Index) 
 
Pro-poor distribution of service benefits: poorer groups receive a greater share of benefits 
from using health services than richer groups (represented by a negative concentration 
Index) 
 
Pro-rich distribution of service benefits: richer groups receive a greater share of benefits 
from using health services than poorer groups (represented by a positive concentration 
Index) 
 
Box 2: Brief overview of health systems in Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania 
After independence from colonial rule, Ghana’s public health system was funded by general 
tax revenue and external assistance, with no charges at the point of service.  In the 1980s, 
substantial user fees were introduced in public health facilities as part of a structural 
adjustment programme.  These fees (called ‘cash and carry’ in Ghana) posed a major barrier 
to health service access and the introduction of a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 
2004 was seen as a way of providing financial protection for Ghanaians.  The NHIS covers 
people in the formal and informal sectors for a relatively comprehensive range of outpatient 
and inpatient services at accredited public and private facilities.  NHIS coverage was 
estimated to be about 60% of the population by 2009, although coverage levels are subject 
to some debate.  While formal sector contributions are transferred from social security 
payroll deductions , those in the informal sector have to pay their district mutual health 
insurance scheme between US$5 and US$35a per person per year according to their socio-
economic status.  A 2.5% VAT levy is dedicated to the NHIS and accounts for the largest share 
of NHIS funding.  Although all Ghanaians are legally required to belong to the NHIS, 
membership is effectively ‘voluntary’ for the informal sector due to the inability to enforce 
contribution payments by this group.  Ghana is currently considering introducing a ‘one time 
payment’ to replace the current annual premiums for those outside the formal sector.  This 
could effectively imply  tax funding for NHI coverage for this group.  Ghana has a per capita 
GDP of US$ (PPP) 1,511 and total health care expenditure is 7.8% of GDP. 
 
South Africa has a long history of private insurance covering mainly higher income formal 
sector employees.  Enrolment is voluntary (although it is frequently a condition of 
employment) and on an individual basis. The premiums paid vary widely (from about $480 - 
$6800 per annumb) depending on the benefit option chosen and the number of dependents 
enrolled. Each private insurance scheme is required to cover a prescribed minimum benefit 
package, which includes certain chronic diseases and inpatient services. While private 
insurance accounts for 44% of total health care financing in South Africa, it covers only 16% 
of the population.  The rest of the population is dependent largely on tax funded public 
sector services, particularly for specialist and inpatient care.  While there are no user fees at 
primary care facilities, there are income-related graduated fees at public hospitals, with 
some provision for exemption of the poor.  Out-of-pocket payments are a relatively small 
share of total health care funding (13%), and most of this is in the form of co-payments by 
those with private insurance cover.  The South African Department of Health has recently 
released a Green Paper to introduce a National Health Insurance, which aims at achieving 
universal coverage.  It proposes a publicly-funded system, which will purchase a 
comprehensive package of services from accredited public and private providers for all 
citizens.  South Africa has a per capita GDP of US$ (PPP) 10,291 and total health care 
expenditure is 8.3% of GDP. 
 
Tanzania has a similar history to that of Ghana, with free publicly-funded health services after 
independence and the introduction of user fees in the 1980s, though on a more limited scale 
than in Ghana.  In the last decade, Tanzania has introduced mandatory health insurance 
schemes for formal sector employees, offering comprehensive health care benefits to their 
members, the largest being the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) covering civil servants. 
The National Social Security Fund (for private formal sector employees) has also introduced a 
Social Health Insurance Benefit (NSSF-SHIB). There is a voluntary insurance scheme, the 
Community Health Fund (CHF), for rural dwellers, with premiums of between $4.2 to $12.7c 
per household per year and offering public primary care to the informal sector. A similar 
scheme was introduced recently for urban dwellers, termed Tiba kwa Kadi (TIKA)d. 
Combined, these insurance schemes covered around 12% of the population at the time of 
this study.  Given the low level of insurance coverage, out-of-pocket payments remain a 
major share of health care funding in Tanzania.  Considerable attention is now being paid to 
expanding insurance coverage of the informal sector through the CHF and TIKA.  In addition, 
management of the operation of CHF and TIKA has been assigned to the NHIF, which could 
open the way for greater integration across insurance schemes.  Tanzania has a per capita 
GDP of US$ (PPP) 1,358 and total health care expenditure is 5.1% of GDP. 
a The interbank exchange rate at the time (September 2008) was GH¢1.40 to US$1.00 
b This is at the relevant exchange rate of ZAR 7.5 to US$1 
c The exchange rate at the time of the study (2008) was Tsh 1178 to US$1.  There is a uniform 
premium within a district, but premium levels vary across districts 
d The TIKA was only introduced shortly before the study; hence, the focus here is on the CHF 
 
Box 3: Key findings of qualitative research 
Availability constraints 
 Long distances to health facilities and poor public transport, particularly in rural areas 
 Frequent drug stock-outs in public facilities 
 Lack of diagnostic equipment in public facilities 
 Insufficient skilled staff, especially doctors 
 Particularly poor availability of services at primary care facilities, leading to high referral 
rates with attendant distance and transport problems 
Affordability constraints 
 Influenced by availability problems (e.g. high transport costs to get to facilities, need to 
purchase drugs from private pharmacies or informal drug sellers) 
 Inability to pay the insurance premiums which would reduce out-of-pocket payments 
 Lack of awareness of entitlement to user fee exemptions or subsidised membership of 
insurance scheme 
 In a medical emergency, households may have to borrow or sell assets: 
“I went for 6 bags of maize and when I went to replace them after the harvest…he said I 
should add 3 bags of maize.  So I ended up returning 9 bags of maize. At the time I borrowed 
from him, a bag cost US$ 9, when he came for the 9 bags each maize bag costs US$ 18. His 
profit was more than US$ 71.” (Focus group discussion, Rural Area, Ghana) 
Acceptability constraints 
 Lack of patient confidence in the expertise of health staff 
 Poor staff attitudes discourage use of facilities: 
“[I stopped going to antenatal care because] the nurse that was helping us had an attitude, 
when we asked her something she treated us like children or comics. She was so impatient 
with us…shouting all the time” (In-depth interview, Urban Area, South Africa) 
 
Table 1: Summary of data sources 
Country Ghana South Africa Tanzania 
Financing incidence and catastrophic health care payments 
National 
Survey 
Ghana Living Standard 
Survey round 5 (GLSS-5) 
Income and Expenditure 
Survey (IES) 
Household Budget Survey 
(HBS) 
Year of survey  2005/06 2005/06 2000/01* 
Households  8,687  21,144 22,178 
Distribution of health service benefits 
Sample 6 districts (1 rural & 1 
urban in each of the 
northern, middle and 
southern belts) # 
National (proportionate 
sample across all 9 South 
African provinces) 
4 rural districts & 3 urban 
councils # 
Year of survey 2008 2008 2008 
Households 2,986 4,800 2,234 
Qualitative evidence on factors affecting financing and benefit incidence 
Focus groups 
and interviews 
26 FGDs (communities) 
29 IDIs (providers) 
44 IDIs (patients) 
67 IDIs (providers) 
 Observations at 13 facilities 
22 FGDs (communities & 
health managers) 
2 IDIs (health managers) 
* Adjusted to reflect prices in 2006 
# Weighted based on geographic location and insurance status to represent national population 
FGDs = focus group discussions; IDIs – in-depth interviews 
  




















OECD countries – Wagstaff et al. (1999)  
Denmark (1987) 0·06 -0·11 0·04 - 0·04 0·03 -0·27 -0·24 -0·01 
Finland (1990) 0·13 -0·10 0·06 0·09 0·06 0·00 -0·24 -0·24 0·02 
France (1989) - - - 0·11 0·11 -0·20 -0·34 -0·31 0·00 
Germany (1989) 0·25 -0·09 0·11 -0·10 -0·05 0·12 -0·10 -0·01 -0·05 
Ireland (1987) 0·27 N/A N/A 0·13 N/A -0·02 -0·15 -0·10 N/A 
Italy (1991) 0·16 -0·11 0·03 0·11 0·07 0·17 -0·08 -0·06 0·04 
Netherlands 
(1992) 
0·20 -0·09 0·07 -0·13 -0·10 0·08 -0·04 0·04 -0·07 
Portugal (1990) 0·22 -0·04 0·06 0·19 0·07 0·14 -0·24 -0·23 -0·05 
Spain (1990) 0·21 -0·15 0·05 0·06 0·05 -0·02 -0·18 -0·16 0·00 
Sweden (1990) 0·05 -0·08 0·04 0·01 0·01 - -0·24 -0.24 -0·02 
Switzerland (1992) 0·21 -0·07 0·16 0·06 0·14 -0·26 -0·36 -0·30 -0·14 
UK (1993) 0·28 -0·15 0·05 0·19 0·08 0·08 -0·22 -0·09 0·05 
US (1987) 0·21 -0·07 0·15 0·02 0·11 -0·24 -0·39 -0·32 -0·13 
Asian countries – O'Donnell et al. (2008b) 
Bangladesh 
(1999–2000) 
0·55 0·11 - - - - 0·22 - 0·21 
China (2000) 0·15 0·04  0·24   −0·02  0·04 
Hong Kong SAR 
(1999–2000) 
0·39 0·11 - - - 0·04 0·01 - 0·17 
Indonesia (2001) 0·20 0·07 - 0·31 - - 0·18 - 0·17 
Japan (1998) 0·10 −0·22 - −0·04 - - −0·27 - −0·07 
Korea Rep. (2000) 0·27 0·04 - −0·16 - - 0·01 - −0·02 
Kyrgyz Rep. (2000) 0·24 0·05 - 0·14 - - −0·05 - 0·01 
Nepal (1995–96) 0·14 0·11 -  - - 0·05 - 0·06 
Philippines (1999) 0·38 0·00 - 0·21  0·12 0·14 - 0·16 
Sri Lanka (1996–7) 




0·07 - 0·09 
Taiwan (2000) 0·26 0·03 - −0·03 - 0·20 −0·10 - −0·01 
Thailand (2002) 0·51 0·18 - 0·18 - 0·00 0·09 - 0·20 
 




* Contributions by the informal sector in Ghana (although the NHI legislation requires all Ghanaians to join the 
NHI, membership is effectively voluntary for those outside the formal sector); Contributions to private health 
insurance schemes in South Africa; Contributions to the Community Health Fund and related schemes in 
Tanzania 
** Mandatory insurance in Ghana only includes the contributions by formal sector employees 
*** General taxes refer to the combination of direct and indirect taxes 





































  Tanzania   South Africa Ghana
Figure 2: Lorenz and concentration curves of indirect taxes in Ghana, South Africa 
and Tanzania 
Note: If the concentration curve lies between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve (or above the 45 degree 














































































































































Figure 3: Lorenz and concentration curves of insurance contributions by those 
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Ghana South Africa Tanzania
Headcount Weighted headcount Catastrophic gap Weighted catastrophic gap
 
Notes 
Headcount: the catastrophic payment headcount index (Hcat), which is the percentage of households 
whose out-of-pocket payments for health care as a percentage of household consumption 
expenditure exceed the threshold 
Gap:  the catastrophic payment gap index (Gcat), which measures the average amount by which out-
of-pocket health care payments as a percentage of household consumption expenditure exceed the 
threshold 
Weighted indices: are weighted according to the individual’s rank in the distribution of consumption 
expenditure; if the weighted index exceeds the unweighted index, the burden of catastrophic 
payments falls more on poorer households 
 
Threshold: 40% non-food household expenditure 
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